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Brief of Plaintiffs and Appellants 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for damages for the loss of 
removing and tearing up a well-established road from 
1 the front of plaintiffs' property and platting lots in the 
1 
road thereby denying the plaintiff access to the road 
leaving them landlocked with the one-acre piece. There. ·. 
by depriving the plaintiffs' of the use of two building 1 • 
lots abutting the road. All done without any legal \ 
process to the plaintiffs or any notice of the proposed 1 
change. The plaintiffs asked that in the alternative ; 
to damages, the road be restored for use by plaintiffs. I 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a judge sitting without a : 
jury and from a judgment of dismissal against the 1: 
plaintiffs, the plaintiffs now appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs and appellants seek a reversal of the ', 
judgment and request judgment in their favor as a 
matter of law, or that failing, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff John Farnsworth purchased a farm ': 
of almost 120 acres (R. 3-185) from Chris and Flor· 
ence Stoven in June of 1943 (R. 20 & 22 170) (War· 
ranty Deed Exhibit P-4). That he first saw the prop· 1 
erty in May or June in 1943 (R. 14-180). At the time 
of purchase there was a road in front of the property 
(R. 29-180) which had been used for quite some time 
and had been established as a County Road (R. 181) 
2 
known as the Little Cottonwood Creek Road shown 
in aerial photograph (Exhibit P-5). (Photo taken 8-
16-46) (R.18-185). 
The road in front of plaintiffs' property remained 
essentially the same as at time of purchase until May 
or June of 1964 at which itme it was torn out by the 
defendant Soters, Inc. That in about 1959 the "by-
pass road" was built (R. 24-185) to avoid the bad 
turn to the north which was in the old road and was 
east of plaintiffs' property. The old road was left in 
front of the plaintiffs' and Jessop's property (Mrs. 
Jessop being the plaintiff's sister to whom he had 
transferred the property immediately to the west of 
his property and on which she lived ( T. 188-11 ) . The 
bypass road was used by the majority of the public 
but the old road abutting the plaintiffs' property was 
used constantly by some people including Mrs. Jessop 
and family until the road was torn up in May or June 
of 1964 ( T. 187-11) and the school bus. It was im-
possible to use it after that. 
The plaintiffs had the sewer put into their prop-
erty in 1963 and a manhole was put in in the street 
in front of the plaintiff's property and sister was 
hooked on it. 
The plaintiff sold the 120 acre farm he owned with 
the exception of the piece he sold to his sister and the 
piece he retained for himself to Happy Valley Incor-
porated (T. 193). 
3 
The property of the plaintiffs being surrounded 
by Willow Creek Country Club Estates (T. 193-14) 
which are built around the country club. There is a , 
road south of the property which does not abutt plain- i 
tiffs' property known as Rubidoux Road, but which 1 
is separated from their property by a protective strip 
about three feet wide over which they were not per. I 
mitted to pass (see Exhibit P-2). 
The plaintiffs' land is surrounded on three sides 
with no access to a road and on July 29, 1964, and 
recorded July 30, 1964, the County Commission ap- : 
proved a subdivision for Soter' s Incorporated for the · 
property immediately to the north where the old road i 
had previously run past plaintiffs' land, which closed in 
the land on all four sides leaving no means of ingress 1 
or egress to the land at all (Exhibit P-1). 
That prior thereto, on September 17, 1958, the 
County Commission had authorized the issuance of 
a deed to Robert Swaner and wife granting him the 
County's interest in the old roadway in exchange for I 
a new right of way at 8200 South and Cottonwood •. 
I 
Creek, and he quitclaimed to the County (See minutes 
1 
of meeting - Exhibit D-17). The County Commission 
on the 29th day of May, 1964, transferred the title to 
Sam F. Soter (Exhibit D-15) who, the same day, I 
transferred the title to Soters Inc. (Exhibit D-24), i 
the present title holder. That all of said transfers and I 
agreements were made without any notice being re· , 
ceived or given to the plaintiffs or the Jessops who were ; 
' 
4 
the only other persons concerned with the right of way. 
The Jessops were left part of the road in front of 
their place and have means of access into their home. 
Neither the County, the defendants the Sommers, 
nor the defendant Soter's Inc. ever gave any warning 
as to the removal of the road even though the County 
was warned by Mr. Oscar McConkie, an attorney em-
ployed by the Jessops (R. 249-256), and even though 
the County did not give Mr. McConkie the courtesy 
of an answer, Soter's Inc. just went ahead and de-
stroyed the road (R. 187 & 208). 
The plaintiffs intended to build a home on part 
of the property and they are now precluded from doing 
so because of the situation. 
There is testimony as to the worth of the property 
given by an expert witness, Nathan Smith, which 
would indicate that the loss of the value of the land 
would be $12,500.00 (R. 225) based on the loss of 
access on the highest possible use. Mr. Smith testified 
that the loss would be $11,240.00 on the cost of cure 
basis to restore the property to its former value by 
repairing the roads and accesses (R. 226). 
The counsel stipulated that a Mr. Verl Smart, a 
school bus driver, would testify that he drove around 
the particular area in question up until the barrier was 
put in in 1964. 
5 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. THAT THE PLAINTIFF \VAS 
1 
DEPRIVED OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE , 
PROCESS OF LAW OR CO_MPENSATION. 
In this particular instance the plaintiffs were deprived 
of access to an established highway which had abutted 
their property for many years, by destruction of the 
road by the defendant and without any notice, legal 
action, nor receipt of any compensation therefor con-
trary to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment of 
) 
the Constitution of the United States providing i. 
"Private property is not to be taken for use :) 
without just compensation." 
Am J ur 2nd 26 Eminent Domain p. 812. At page 823 ) 
of the same title and volume states 
"As a general rule, there is a taking of prop- ' 
erty within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision 'nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation,' where 
the act involves an actual interference with, or 
disturbance of, property rights, as distinguished 
from injuries which are merely consequential or 
incidental, ... " 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah 
Article I, Sec. 7, provide that property cannot be taken 
without due process of the law. This is shown at section 
376 Eminent Domain of Vol. 27 Am J ur 2nd p. W 
which states, among other things, 
6 
"Inasmuch as both federal and state consti-
tutions protect all persons from being deprived 
of their property without due process of the law 
and warrant equal protection of the law, pro-
ceedings to condemn property must be such as 
not to violate these guaranties." 
It further points out that no particular form or method 
is guaranteed but "Its requirements are satisfied if he 
has reasonable notice and opportunity to present his 
claim or defense." 
"That no person shall be deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property without due process of law." 
Here there was no notice or opportunity to be heard 
and, in fact, it was not known about until the spring 
of 1963 when, in truth, the Commission made the Agree-
ment to give the street away in 1958. 
The only question here remaining is whether the 
road taken which abutted the plaintiff's land is prop-
erly for which the plaintiff should be compensated. 
It is contended that the right of access is a property 
right which must be taken by due process and the 
plaintiffs must be fully compensated for the taking. 
It is recognized in Arizona that such a taking re-
quires compensation as shown in Fletcher v. State, 
367 Pac. 2nd, 272, which states: 
L 
"Fletcher alleges error in not granting sever-
ance damages for loss of access. Trial conducted 
on the theory that the loss of access was not com-
pensable heid 'In view of our recent holdings 
that either the destruction or the material im-
7 
pairment of the access easement of an abutting 
property owner to a controlled access highway 
is compensable.' " · 
In Idaho, in the case of Johnson v. Boise City, 
390 Pac. 2nd, 291, which was a case involving an access 
the court staled : ' 
"This court has consistently held that access 
to a public way is one of the incidents of owner-
ship of land bounding such right is appurtenant 
to the land and is a vested right." 
Quoted from Ferris v. City of Twin Falls, 347 Pac 
2nd, 996, they cite numerous and sundry other Idaho 
cases in support of this position. 
In Utah, the case of J. Herbert Hansen and wife 
v. Utah Road Commission, 14 U. 2nd 305, 383 Pac. 
2nd 917. The court did not make an additional award 
for loss of access but recognized that a loss of access 
was a factor in the settlement of the case by stating 
"Where right of access was appurtenant to the 
property taken, damage resulting due to loss of , 
access from the half remaining portion of prop-
erty was necessarily considered as a factor in 
increasing the a ward of the land which was taken 
under the instruction that properly owners were 
entitled to the difference in the value of the re-
maining tract before and after taking and that 
there was no existing easement to the remaining , 
land." 




In the case of Bare v. Department of Highways, 
401 Pac. 2d, 552, in Idaho, the court stated: 
"'Ve have recognized that an abutting prop-
erty owner's right of reasonable access to a pub-
lic highway is a property right which may not 
be taken by the state without just compensa-
tion. 'Vhen such property is taken without com-
pensation, the owner may recover in an action 
in inverse condemnation, the damages to his 
property caused by the taking." 
The 1953 Utah Code Annotated as Amended provides 
in Title 27, Chapter 1, Section 2 that: 
"A highway shall be deemed to have been 
dedicated and abandoned to the use of the public 
when it has been continuously used as a public 
thoroughfare for a period of ten years." 
In this particular instance, the evidence shows that 
this had been used for more than ten years and had 
become a public highway. This is supported by the 
case of Morris v. Blunt, 49 U. 243, 161 P. 1127 which 
states that 
"Under this section, the highway, even though 
it be over privately owned ground, will be deemed 
dedicated or abandoned to the public use when 
the public has continuously used it as a thorough-
fare for a period of 10 years, but such use must 
be by the public." 
While the next section provides that all highways 
continue until abandoned by the County Commissioners 
or other competent authority, it would seem that here 
there has been such an abandonment as the County 
9 
traded this to Sommers and subsequently to the de. 
fendant, Soter' s Incorporated. This would be under 
the police power. However, in the case of Hague\', 
Juab County, 37 U. 290, 107 P. 249, it states 
"While public may abandon street or highwav 
insofar as it affects right of public therein, such 
abandonment, however, will not affect rights of 
abutting owner with respect to use of easement 
he may have in street for purposes of ingress and 
egress to and from his premises." 
Also, in the case of Tuttle v. Sowadzki, 41 U. 501, 126 
P. 959. 
"While highway by abandonment may 
out of jurisdiction of local authorities, rights of 
abutting owners will not be affected." 
In other words, even though the County deeded by 
quitclaim whatever right it had in the road, 
Incorporated took subject to all the plaintiffs' right! 
in the road as to right of "access" and property right. 
Under Title 27, Chapter 1, Section 7, the law 
provides, among other things, 
"A transfer of land bounded by a highway 
passes the title of the person whose estate is 
transferred to the middle of the highway." 
In this particular instance, while the highway was not 
on land described in the deed to the plaintiff, but was 
in the area of the land which eventually came down to 
the Sommers, and from them to Sam Soter and Soter's 
Inc., still there was an established right of way for the 
10 
public use when plaintiff received this land by deed 
in 1943 and he had a property right to the middle of the 
street. 
In 47 A.L.R. 902 under an Annotation - Power 
to Deny Abuttter Access to Street or Highway, it 
states 
"Regardless of whether the fee of the street 
or highway is in the abutting owners or in the 
public, such an owner has a special easement 
therein for purposes of ingress and egress, which 
is property as much as the abutting lot itself, and 
which cannot be taken away or materially im-
paired or interfered with, even under legislative 
authority, without compensation to him there-
for." 
This annotation further goes on to quote the case of 
Anzalone v. Metropolitan District Commission of the 
Common Wealth in Massachusetts 153 N.E. 325 
"The court in the reported case declares the 
right of access to the highway to be one of the 
incidents of the ownership of the abutting prop-
erty, whether the fee of the highway is in the 
municipality or in private ownership; and with-
out denying the right of the commission to make 
reasonable regulations as to the place and size 
of the approach, does deny its power altogether 
to exclude the abutting owner from access to the 
highway ... " 
This case is reported on page 897 of the same 
volume and further states at 902 
"The exercise of a legal right may be regu-
11 
lated but it is not to be taken away without legis-
lative action." 
This also points out at 901 
"That if land adjacent to a roadway ... 
should be divided into lots in separate owner-
ship, each owner would have a right of access 
from his lot to this roadway." 
This is directly comparable to the case in question 
where the plaintiff had sufficient land to make two lots 
on the north end and which abutted the roadway which 
was vacated. This road would have served both lots. 
In volume 43 A.L.R. 2d p. 1072 treats on the subject 
"Abuttipg owner's right to damages or other 
relief for loss of access . . . " 
Under section three on page 1074, it states 
"Where an established 'land-service road,' in 
which the normal right of access had already 
come into being, is converted into a limited-
access way in such a manner that the existing 
right of access are destroyed, the owners of such 
rights are entitled to compensation, exactly as 
they would be if such rights were destroyed by 
any other type of construction." 
and states, among other cases, People v. La Macchia 
quoted on page 1075 
" ... the conversion of a highway to a freeway: 
the right of access from various landowners 
properties was strictly limited, the court, ap· 
proving an award of compensation which includ· 
ed a substantial amount for impairment of the 
12 
pre-existing right of access, held that no rever· 
sible error arose from an instruction stating that 
the owner of abutting land had a private righi 
in such highway, distinct from that of the public, 
for the purpose of access to his land." 
Also, in the Department of Public 'Vorks and Build-
ings v. Wolf, 111 NE2d 322 
--
"It was held that pre-existing rights of access 
to a highway would not be taken by the mere 
action of the state in declaring the highway a 
freeway and posting freeway signs along the 
boundary of the property, the court saying that 
such rights constituted valuable property which 
could not be taken without compensation." 
This annotation recognizes and brings out the fact 
that impairment of access or circuity of travel will not 
give rise to compenstaion. In this particular instance, 
the court cited the Springville Bank v. State of Utah 
as support for its position. However, this was clearly 
in line with the circuity of travel for access and, in the 
opinion of the plaintiff, the law established was not 
applicable to the instant case. 
As a further supplement to the annotation, in Vol-
ume 4 of the A.L.R. 2d, Later Case Service, the anno-
tation which is found on page 903, the court cites vari-
ous and sundry cases in numerous jurisdictions, among 
others, the following: 
"Property owner abutting upon public street 
or highway has property right in nature of ease-
13 
ment of ingress and egress to and from his prop-
erty and such right cannot be taken from him 
without just compensation. Taking of easement 
of access to public highways is compensable in 
terms of severance damages, that is, in terms 
of diminution in value of property which for. 
merly had easement of access. People by De-
partment of Public 'V orks v Renaud, 198 Cai 
App 2d 581, 17 Cal Rptr 67 4." Also 
"Right of access in and to street or highwav 
attached to abutting lands which is a propert), 
right and cannot be taken for public use without 
just compensation. Such right of access is jus-
tified upon grounds of necessity and is such as 
is reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the 
land for all purposes to which it is adapted, sub-
ject, however, to reasonable regulations of state 
highway commission with respect to entrances. 
Riddle v. State Highway Com., 184 Kan 608, 
339 P2d 301." Again 
"Access easements appropriated by state for 
construction of parkway are property and are 
protected by state constitutions from being taken 
without just compensation. Gilmore v State, 
208 Misc 427, 143 NY S2d 873." .Further 
"Real property consists not alone of tangible 
things but also of certain rights therein sane· 
tioned by law, such as right to access, ingress, 
and egress, and owners of property abutting .a 
street or highway cannot be deprived by pu.bhc 
authorities of all access thereto without .iust 
compensation, since such deprivation 
to a taking of the property. Iowa State 
way Com. v Smith (Iowa) 82 N'V2d 755. 
"Reconstruction of highway which renders 
14 
abutting landowner's property less accessible to 
highway, or approach less convenient, consti-
tutes taking of valuable property right which is 
compensable. Mississippi State Highway Com. 
v Finch (Miss.) ll4 So 2d 673." 
"Right of owner of property abutting on pub-
lic highway to ingress and egress when portion 
of property is taken by state under power of 
eminent domain as right of way for limited-
access highway is property right which is pro-
tected by S 14 of the state constitution and cannot 
be taken or damaged without just compensa-
tion. Chandler v Hjelle (ND) 126 NW2d 141." 
"If a free way is built in such a manner as to 
deny a landowner any access to such highway 
where he theretofore had full access to a con-
ventional highway, then unquestionably his right 
of access has been taken from him, and taker 
must pay him for such property right. His loss 
is generally shown by the before-and-after mar-
ket value of the property. Pennysavers Oil Co. 
v State (Tex Civ App) 334 S-\V2d 546, error 
ref." 
This also cites on the impairment of access a number 
of cases which have given the owner of the property 
compensation for mere circuity of access and we cite 
the following: 
"One whose right of access from his property 
to abutting highway is cut off or substantially 
interfered with by vacation of closing of road 
is entitled to damages. Ent if his access is not 
so terminated or obstructed, if he has same 
access to highway as he did before the closing, 
his damage is not special, but of same kind, 
15 
although it may be greater in degree, as that of 
publi?, he has lost no property right 
for which he is entitled to compensation. 'Varren 
v Iowa State Highway Com. (Iowa) 93 
60." 
"Notwithstanding availability of frontage 
road from which property owner's abutting prop-
erty had circuitous access to main thoroughfare 
at remote interchanges, owner suffered com-
pensable damage if highway to which he pre-
viously had immediate and unlimited access was 
rebuilt on existing right of way in manner which 
denied him reasonably convenient and suitable 
access to main thoroughfare in at least 1 direc-
tion. Hendrickson v State, 267 Minn 436, 127 
NW2d 165 (citing annotation)." 
In a book put out by the American Association 
of State Highway Officials entitled "Acquisition for 
Right-of-Way," 1962 Edition, with respect to High-
way Access, it states in Chapter 10, page 112 
"At the earlier stages of highway develop-
ment in America, the landowners bore most of 
the burden of constructing and maintaining pub· 
lie roads. Highways were built to serve the land 
-to provide a means of getting to and from the 
land. Naturally, with the shift in the character 
of travel, the burden of providing a highway 
system soon shifted to the government. How· 
ever, the rights of the abutter, that were gene-
rated at the time when the provisions of roads 
were the responsibility of the property owner 
and were built to serve the landowner, still per· 
sisted. 
The rights which the abutting owner or oc· 
16 
cupant has in the existing conventional highway, 
in addition to the right of passage shared with 
the general public, are the right of access, air, 
light and view. These rights accrue to the abut-
ting land because the original function of the 
conventional highway was to serve the land as 
well as the motorist and his vehicle. The right 
of access includes the right of the abutter to 
ingress and egress from his premises. This 
right is appurtenant to the land and accrues to 
an occupant of abutting land as well as to the 
owner, and accrues even if the property is vacant. 
It is immaterial whether the State owns the fee 
in the highway or only an easement for highway 
purposes. The right of the abutter has been de-
fined as an easement in the highway which is as 
much a property right as the land itself to 
which it pertains. 
These cases are supported by numerous and sundry 
cases cited in the foot notes on pages 130 and 131. On 
page 114 of the same volume, states 
"Under the police power, vehicular access may 
be reduced to a minimum; but an abutting owner 
may not be completely deprived of all ingress 
to and egress from his property." 
"As has been suggested, access may be regu-
lated to some extent under the police power. On 
the other hand, the power of government to deny 
access altogether is by the constitu-
tional requirement that compensation be paid 
for the taking (and in some States, the damag-
ing) of property. 
As has been indicated, the courts have con-
sidered the right of access to be a property right 
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appurtenant to the land abutting the highway. 
As the Kentucky Supreme Court has 
it in Elizabethtown, Lexington and Big Sand 
Railroad, 17 Ky 382, 19 Am Rep. 76 
'The private right of the lot-owner in the ad-
jacent street being conceded to be property, sueh 
appropriation or obstruction of the street as 
deprives him of its reasonable use deprives him 
to that extent of his property, and no reason 
is perceived why this species of property can 
be taken without just compensation rather than 
any other.' 
An examination of the judicial decisions 
wherein the abutter has claimed compensation on 
constitutional grounds reveals that the courts are 
substantially in agreement as to the rules of 
law which apply, though there is some variation ' 
among the jurisdictions as to its application to 
particular fact situations. 
Before an abutter is entitled to compensation 
for the impairment of his access rights, he must 
show that he suffers a special injury, differin!( 
in kind and not merely in degree from that sul- , 
fered by the public in general." 
"The abutter is not entitled to access at all 
points of his property, and as long as a suitable 
means of access is left to him, he has suffered 
no legal injury. But in cases where the obstruc· 
tion deprived the abutter of a 'suitable' means 
of access or where impariment of access resulted 
in loss of value of the property, the abutter has 
been awarded compensation. In such situations. 
the abutter is deemed to have suffered a special 
injury differing from that suffered by the geu· 
eral public. Of course, where all access is com· 
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pletely cut off and the owner is left landlocked, 
the abutter must be comnensated since this is a 
taking of the property right of access. 
It is true that a person cannot recover compen-
sation for a loss unless he has suffered damage. Here 
a yery experienced real estate appraiser testified to the 
amount of the damage. In assessment of the damages, 
the State Highway Officials book, as previously cited, 
sets forth a good guide in Chapter 4, page 33, 
Market Value 
"Fair cash market value is the normally ac-
cepted standard for the measure of compensa-
tion. It is generally stated that fair cash market 
value is the amount of money which a purchaser, 
willing but not obligated to buy the property, 
would pay to an owner willing but not obligated 
to sell it, taking into consideration all uses to 
which the land was adopted and might in reason 
be applied." Nichols on Eminent Domain, 3rd 
Edition, Vol. 4, Section 12.2 ( 1) 
"Present and Anticipated Use 
In determining the fair cash market value of 
the property taken, the owner is not limited to 
the value of the property for the purposes for 
which it was actually used. The value of prop-
erty should be based upon its most profitable 
legal use. Any reasonable future use to which 
the land might be adopted or applied may be 
considered in arriving at the present market 
value. This is distinguished and separate from 
the owner's vague plans or hopes for the future 
which are completely irrelevant." Nichols, Sec. 
12.314. 
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"The value of property for the use to which 
reasonable men would devote it if owned by 
them must be taken as the ultimate test." 
Nichols 
" 'Before and After' Rule 
When only a portion of the land is taken, the 
better rule of valuation seems to be the 'before 
and after' method. This consists of determining 
the difference between the market value of the 
entire property before the taking and its value 
after the taking." Jahr Eminent Domain, Valu-
ation and Procedure, Section 98. "It has the ad. 
vantage of eliminating the double compensation 
problem by simply subtracting the value of the 
remainder after the taking from the value of the 
whole before the taking. It has the disadvantage, . 
however, of being susceptible to padding, since 
noncompensable items of damages can be wrong· 
fully reflected in the estimated after value, and 
thus may be included as part of the purported 
severance damages. The other rule accepted by 
the courts in partial taking cases is the deter· 
mination of the value of the land taken, together 
with the severance damage to the remainder, 
without going into the entire tract value before 
and after the taking." 
Here there was no contrary evidence presented so the 
evidence of damage would have to stand. 
The defendants set up as a defense the doctrine 
of estoppel and laches and included this in their motion 
for dismissal. However, this would be or no force and 
effect as the statute provides that for a four year statute 
of limitations to bring the action. The defendants 
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have contended because the trade was originally made 
by Sommers with the County in 1958 that the time 
should start running as of that time. However, the 
trade and quitclaim deed as executed in 1958 were 
not a denial of access and the denial came in 1964 as 
shown by all of the evidence when there was an actual 
tearing up of the road and until there was an actual 
taking of the road, the right would not arise as there 
would have been no damages prior to that time. 
It is noted in the cases cited previously, that the 
governing body can dispose of its right in a highway 
but this does not affect the abutting property owners' 
right in the highway, so mere transfer of the title 
would not be a denial of access and hence the judge 
would have been in error if he had based his motion 
on the doctrine of laches and estoppel. 
In vacating a right of way prior to 1965, there was 
no specific m ethod set forth as to how this should be 
done, but in 1965 the Legislature specifically set forth 
in Title 27, Chapter 12, Section 102.4 of the 1953 
Utah Code Annotated as amended, which provides for 
means of notice and sets up the specific steps required, 
none of which were fallowed in this particular case. As 
pointed out in cases previously cited, the way it was 
handled does not even comply in any sense of the word 
with the requirement of the constitutional provision 
for due process. 
It is noted that there was no evidence at all pre-
sented on behalf of the defendants so that all the testi-
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mony for the plaintiffs would have to be assumed tu 
be true and construed in the most liberal manner iii 
their favor and we contend, when applying the law 
to the facts as presented to the court, that it is very 
clear that there was a property right taken 
compensation and without due process. 
Point Two. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT 
PERMITTING THE CASE TO BE TRIED 
BEFORE A JURY. 
It is noted that on the 14th of February, 1969, the 
plaintiffs gave notice of the calling of a jury trial and 
paid the jury fee therefor. That thereafter the defend-
ants gave notice of their objection to the calling of a 
jury and their motion was heard on the 25th of Feb-
ruary, 1969, at which time the objection to the calling 
of a jury was sustained through the shortness of notice. 
Please note that the matter was set for February 2G, 
1969, and had been delayed on numerous and sundry 
occasions by efforts of the defendants to get all of their 
parties in to the point where it was hard to determine 
where, when and if this matter would be tried. It J) 
noted that it was definitely set for November 25, 1968, 
but that the setting was changed to February 26th 
as shown in the notice dated the 25th day of November, 
1968 (R. 132). 
The plaintiffs contend that the defendants had 
plenty of time and notice and were aware at all times 
that this matter was to be tried before a jury so that 
it did not take them by surprise and after notice, the)· 
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had from the 14th to the 26th to prepare the case, and 
based upon the calendars and the crowded manner in 
which cases have to be pushed through in a day or two 
notice, this would not have been as inconvenient as a 
two-day notice of trial would have been and would not 
have discommoded them. 
While the matter of jury trial is somewhat dis-
cretionary matter with the presiding judge, still it 
is such a fundamental procedure and right in American 
jurisprudence that the right to a jury trial should not 
be lightly denied. In some instances, parties have been 
required to accept a jury without any notice whatso-
ever and so we believe that it was error to deny plain-
tiffs a jury trial. 
CONCLUSION 
From all of the cases cited and the law as almost 
universally accepted throughout the various states of 
the union, it is very clear and convincing that the 
judgment of dismissal of the District Court was in 
error. That the plaintiffs had a vested right in the 
abutting road and that they could not be deprived of 
the use of the road without due process of the law as a 
taking of a property right without due process and 
without compensation would be contrary to the Fifth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
and the Constitution of the State of Utah. That the 
case should be remanded to the District Court with 





as they now appear to be, that an award for damages 
shou]d be made to the plaintiffs for the unlawful taking 
in the amount of the market value of the property 
taken. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOTHAIRE R. RICH 
No. 16 East Stratford Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Attorney for Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 
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